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Abstract
New advances in machine learning have made Automated
Speech Recognition (ASR) systems practical and more scal-
able. These systems, however, pose serious privacy threats
as speech is a rich source of sensitive acoustic and textual in-
formation. Although offline and open-source ASR eliminates
the privacy risks, its transcription performance is inferior to
that of cloud-based ASR systems, especially for real-world
use cases. In this paper, we propose Prεεch, an end-to-end
speech transcription system which lies at an intermediate
point in the privacy-utility spectrum. It protects the acoustic
features of the speakers’ voices and protects the privacy of
the textual content at an improved performance relative to
offline ASR. Additionally, Prεεch provides several control
knobs to allow customizable utility-usability-privacy trade-
off. It relies on cloud-based services to transcribe a speech
file after applying a series of privacy-preserving operations
on the user’s side. We perform a comprehensive evaluation of
Prεεch, using diverse real-world datasets, that demonstrates
its effectiveness. Prεεch provides transcription at a 2% to
32.25% (mean 17.34%) relative improvement in word error
rate over Deep Speech, while fully obfuscating the speakers’
voice biometrics and allowing only a differentially private
view of the textual content.
1 Introduction
New advances in machine learning and the abundance of
speech data have made Automated Speech Recognition (ASR)
systems practical and reliable [4, 16]. ASR systems have
achieved a near-human performance on standard datasets [4,
16], at a scale. This scalability is desirable in many domains,
such as journalism [24], law, business, education, and health
care, where cost, delay, and third-party legal implications [28]
prohibit the application of manual transcription services [11].
For example, recent research has identified private voice tran-
scription as one of the challenges journalists face when inter-
viewing sensitive sources [24].
Several companies, such as Google and Amazon, provide
online APIs for speech transcription. This convenience, how-
ever, comes at the cost of privacy. A speech recording contains
acoustic features that can reveal sensitive information about
the user, such as age, gender [38], emotion [3, 39], accent,
and health conditions [40]. The acoustic features are also
biometric identifiers of the speakers [25], enabling speaker
identification and impersonation [19]. Additionally, the tex-
tual content of speech can be sensitive [28]. For example,
medical recordings can contain private health information
about patients [11], and business recordings can include pro-
prietary information. Current cloud services already support
several speech processing APIs like speaker identification
and diarization. They also support text analysis APIs, such
as topic modeling, document categorization, sentiment analy-
sis, and entity detection (Sec. 3.2), that can extract sensitive
information from text. Applying these APIs to the recorded
speech can significantly undermine the user’s privacy.
Offline and open-source transcription services, like Deep
Speech [17], solve these privacy challenges as the speech
files never leave the user’s trust boundary. However, we find
that their performance does not match that of a cloud ser-
vice provider [44], especially on real-world conversations and
different accents (Sec. 2.2). Thus, the primary goal of this
paper is to: provide an intermediate solution along the utility-
privacy spectrum that uses cloud services while providing a
formal privacy guarantee.
We present Prεεch (Privacy-Preserving Speech) as a means
to achieve this goal; it is an end-to-end speech transcription
system that: (1) protects the users’ privacy along the acoustic
and textual dimensions; (2) improves the transcription per-
formance relative to offline ASR; and (3) provides the user
with control knobs to customize the trade-offs between utility,
usability, and privacy.
Textual Privacy: Prεεch segments and shuffles the input
speech file to break the context of the text, effectively trans-
forming it into a bag-of-words. Then, it injects dummy (noise)
segments to provide the formal privacy guarantee of differen-
tial privacy (DP) [12].
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Acoustic Privacy: Prεεch applies voice conversion to protect
the acoustic features of the input speech file and ensure noise
indistinguishability.
We evaluate Prεεch over a set of real-world datasets cover-
ing diverse demographics. Our evaluation shows that Prεεch
provides a superior transcription accuracy relative to Deep
Speech, the state-of-the-art offline ASR. Also, Prεεch pre-
vents cloud services from extracting any user-specific acous-
tic features from the speech. Finally, applying Prεεch thwarts
the learning of any statistical models or sensitive information
extraction from the text via natural language processing tools.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are:
(1) End-to-end practical system: We propose Prεεch, a new
end-to-end system that provides privacy-preserving speech
transcription at an improved performance relative to offline
transcription. Specifically, Prεεch shows a relative improve-
ment of 2% to 32.52% (mean 17.34%) in word error rate
(WER) on real-world evaluation datasets over Deep Speech,
while fully obfuscating the speakers’ voice biometrics and
allowing only a DP view of the textual content.
(2) Non-standard use of differential privacy: Prεεch uses
DP in a non-standard way, giving rise to a set of new chal-
lenges. Specifically, the challenges are (1) “noise” corre-
sponds to concrete words, and need to be added in the speech
domain (2) “noise” has to be indistinguishable from the origi-
nal speech (details in Sec. 4.5).
(3) Customizable Design: Prεεch provides several control
knobs for users to customize the functionality based on their
desired levels of utility, usability, and privacy (Sec. 7.4). For
example, in a relaxed privacy setting, Prεεch’s relative im-
provement in WER ranges from 44% to 80% over Deep
Speech (Sec. 7.4.1).
Some demonstrations of Prεεch are available at this
link [2].
2 Speech Transcription Services
We first provide some background on online and offline
speech transcription services. Next, we present a utility evalu-
ation using standard and real-world speech datasets.
2.1 Background
Speech transcription refers to the process of extracting text
from a speech file. ASR systems are available to the users
either through cloud-based online APIs or offline software.
(1) Cloud-Based Transcription: We utilize two cloud-based
speech transcription services – Google’s Cloud Speech-to-
Text and Amazon Transcribe.
(2) Offline Transcription: We consider the Deep Speech ar-
chitecture from Baidu [17], which is trained using Mozilla’s 1
Common Voice dataset as a representative offline transcription
1https://voice.mozilla.org/en/datasets
service. This dataset is crowdsourced and open-source. Specif-
ically, we use the Deep Speech 0.4.1 model 2 (released in Jan-
uary 2019). Note that we do not consider offline transcribers
that are not open for general use. For example, Google’s on-
device speech recognizer [1] is an offline transcriber that is
currently only supported on Google’s Pixel devices and does
not allow an API or open-source access, limiting its usability.
Notations: Let S denote the input speech file associated with
a ground truth transcript T gS . The user can either use a cloud
service provider (CSP) or an offline service provider (OSP) to
obtain the transcript (denoted by TCSPS or T
OSP
S , respectively).
Transcription Accuracy: The standard metric for quanti-
fying the accuracy loss from transcription is the word error
rate (WER) [17]. WER treats the transcript as a sequence of
words. It models the difference between the two sequences
by counting the number of deleted words (D), the number of
substituted words (U), and the number of injected words (I).
If the number of words in T gS is W , WER is given as:
D+U+I
W .
2.2 Utility Comparison
In this section, we empirically evaluate the utility gap between
the CSP and the OSP over a wide range of standard and real-
world datasets. We use these datasets throughout the paper.
Standard Datasets: These datasets include (1) the TIMIT-
TEST subset [15], (2) a subset from Librispeech dev-clean
dataset [30], and (3) the DAPS dataset [27]. TIMIT-TEST 3
subset comprises of 1344 utterances by 183 speakers from
eight major dialect regions of the United States. The Lib-
riSpeech subset consists of eleven speakers, 20 utterances
each. For DAPS, we use the evaluation subset prepared for
the 2018 voice conversion challenge [23] that consists of five
scripts read by ten speakers: five males and five females.
Real-world Datasets: We also assess the real-world perfor-
mance of both transcription services on non-American accent
datasets and real conversations among speakers of different
demographics. For the accented datasets, we evaluate 200 ut-
terances of two speakers from the VCTK dataset [45]: speaker
p262 of a Scottish accent and speaker p266 of an Irish accent.
For the real-world datasets, we evaluate 20 minutes of speech
from the "Facebook, Social Media Privacy, and the Use and
Abuse of Data" hearing before the U.S. Senate 4. We con-
struct the 20 minutes by selecting three continuous chunks of
speech from the hearing such that they include nine speakers:
8 senators and Mark Zuckerberg. Another real-world dataset
is the Supreme Court of the United States case "Carpenter v.
United States" 5. For this dataset, we evaluate a total of 40
minutes of speech from the advocates in the case.
2https://github.com/mozilla/DeepSpeech
3https://catalog.ldc.upenn.edu/LDC93S1
4https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2018/4/facebook-social-media-
privacy-and-the-use-and-abuse-of-data
5https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-402
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Datasets Google AWS Deep Speech
St
an
da
rd LibriSpeech 9.14 8.83 9.37
DAPS 6.70 7.53 10.65
TIMIT TEST 6.27 7.11 20.08
N
on
-S
ta
nd
ar
d
VCTK p266 5.15 10.09 26.72
VCTK p262 4.53 7.87 15.97
Facebook 1 5.76 7.45 24.72
Facebook 2 3.07 8.19 26.61
Facebook 3 8.32 9.42 30.72
Carpenter 1 9.44 9.44 25.85
Carpenter 2 9.22 11.53 39.71
Table 1: WER (%) comparison of cloud services, Google and
AWS, versus the state-of-the-art offline system, Deep Speech.
Accuracy Comparison: Table 1 presents the WER compar-
ison results. The results show that the CSPs are superior to
the OSP on all the datasets. The performance gap, however,
is more significant on the non-standard datasets; the CSP
outperforms Deep Speech by 60% to 80% in WER.
3 Privacy Threat Analysis
We study the privacy threats that a cloud-based transcription
service poses while processing private speech data.
3.1 Voice Analysis
The biometric information embedded in S can leak sensi-
tive information about the speakers, including their emo-
tional status [3, 39], health condition [40], sex [38], and even
identity [25]. Furthermore, extracting this information en-
ables critical attacks like voice cloning and impersonation
attacks [22, 46]. In this section, we showcase a few represen-
tative examples of how cloud-based APIs can pose serious
privacy threats to the acoustic features within S.
Speaker Diarization: CSPs utilize advanced diarization ca-
pabilities to cluster the speakers within a speech file, even
if they have not been observed before. The basic idea is to
(1) segment the speech file into segments of voice activity,
and (2) extract a speaker-specific embedding from each seg-
ment, such that (3) segments with close enough embeddings
should belong to the same speaker. We verified the strength
of the diarization threat over three multi-speaker datasets:
VCTK (mixing p266 and p262), Facebook, and Carpenter.
We measure the performance of the IBM diarization service
using Watson’s Speech-to-Text API 6 via Diarization Error
Rate (DER). DER estimates the fraction of time the speech
file segments are not attributed to the correct speaker clus-
ter. The DER values are 0%, 4.85%, and 1.32% for the three
6https://www.ibm.com/cloud/watson-speech-to-text
datasets, respectively. Hence, the API can correctly distin-
guish between, and cluster, the different speakers, more than
95% of the entire dataset duration despite lacking any prior
information about the individual speakers.
Speaker Identification: A speaker identification task maps
the speech segments in a speech file to an individual. We use
the Azure Identification API, which consists of two stages: (1)
user enrollment and (2) identification (whether a given voice
sample matches any of the enrolled users). The enrollment
stage requires only 30 seconds of speech from each user to
extract their voice-print. We enrolled 22 speakers as follows:
10 from DAPS, two from VCTK, two from Carpenter, and
eight from Facebook. The identification accuracy was nearly
100% for all speakers.
Speaker Cloning and Impersonation: Lastly, we applied a
Tacotron-based speech synthesizer from Google [19]; a net-
work that can synthesize speech in the voice of any speaker.
The network generates a target speaker’s embedding, which it
uses to synthesize speech on a given piece of text. In our set-
ting, we used the network to generate the speakers’ embedding
in our evaluation datasets. Then, we synthesized eight speech
utterances using the embeddings of each speaker. We enrolled
the speakers in Azure’s Speech Identification API using their
natural voice samples and tested whether the API will map the
synthesized segments to the corresponding speaker. Except
for the second speaker in Carpenter, the cloned samples were
successfully identified as the true speakers.
3.2 Text Analysis
CSPs possess natural language processing (NLP) capabili-
ties that enable automated statistical analyses on large sets
of documents. Those analyses fall into two broad categories.
The first type involves identifying specific words from the
transcript that correspond to sensitive information such as an
address, name, and SSN using named-entity extraction [13].
The other type of analysis involves statistically analyzing the
entire transcript on the whole to extract some semantic or
user-identifying information. This analysis uses two types of
information: the set of words (i.e., bag-of-words representa-
tion of the transcript) and their order of appearance (to capture
the context).
Bag-of-Words Analysis: One of the most commonplace anal-
ysis that treats a document as a bag-of-words is topic mod-
eling [36, 42]. Topic modeling is an unsupervised machine
learning technique that identifies clusters of words that best
characterize a set of documents. Another popular technique
is stylometry analysis, which aims at attributing authorship
(in our case, the speaker) of a document based on its literary
style. It is based on computing a set of stylistic features like
mean word length, words histogram, special character count,
and punctuation count from the disputed document [29].
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Context-based Analysis: An example of context-based anal-
ysis is sentiment analysis (understanding the overall attitude
in a block of text). Text categorization is another example; it
refers to classifying a document according to a set of prede-
termined labels.
4 Prεεch
Our discussion in the previous sections highlights a trade-off
between privacy and utility. The OSP provides perfect privacy
at the cost of higher error rates, especially for non-standard
speech datasets. On the other hand, clear privacy violations
accompany revealing the speech recording to the CSP. Moti-
vated by this trade-off, we present Prεεch, a practical system
that lies at an intermediate point along the utility-privacy
spectrum of speech transcription.
4.1 System and Threat Models
We consider the scenario where users have audio recordings
of private conversations that require high transcription accu-
racy. For example, a journalist with recordings of confidential
interviews is a paradigmatic user for Prεεch. Other exam-
ples include a therapist with recordings of patient therapy
sessions or a course instructor with oral examination records
of students. Prεεch, however, does not target real-time tran-
scription applications. For example, voice assistants and on-
line transcription (e.g. a live-streaming press conference) are
out-of-scope. Thus, for our target use cases, the latency of
transcription is not a critical concern.
The adversary is the CSP or any other entity having direct
or indirect access to the stored speech at the CSPs. This adver-
sary is capable of the aforementioned voice- and text-based
analysis.
4.2 Prεεch Overview
Prεεch provides an end-to-end tunable system which aims at
satisfying the following design goals:
1. protect the users’ privacy along the acoustic and textual
dimensions;
2. improve on the transcription accuracy compared to offline
models; and
3. provide the users with control knobs to customize Prεεch’s
functionality according to their desired level of utility, us-
ability, and privacy.
To this end, Prεεch applies a series of privacy-preserving
operations to the input speech file before sending it to the
CSP. Fig. 1 shows the high-level overview of Prεεch. Below,
we briefly describe Prεεch’s privacy-preserving operations.
4.2.1 Preserving Textual Privacy
Prεεch protects the privacy of the textual content of an input
speech file S through the following three operations:
Segmentation and shuffling: Prεεch breaks S into a se-
quence of segments, denoted by S. This is followed by shuf-
fling the segments to remove all ordering information. Thus,
segmenting and shuffling S transform its textual content into
a bag-of-words representation.
Sensitive word scrubbing (SWS): First, Prεεch applies the
OSP to identify the list of sensitive keywords that contain
numbers, proper nouns, or any other user-specified words.
Next, Prεεch applies keyword spotting, KWS, (identify por-
tions of the speech that correspond to a keyword) to each of
the segments in S. Only the segments that do not contain a
keyword pass to the CSP for transcription.
Dummy word injection to ensure differential privacy:
The bag-of-words representation of a transcript corresponds
to its word histogram (Sec. 4.5). As discussed in Sec. 3.2,
several statistical analyses can be built on the word histogram
of the transcript TCSPS such as topic modeling or stylometry
analysis. Thus, protecting the privacy of this word histogram
is a primary focus of Prεεch, and the privacy guarantee we
choose is that of differential privacy. To this end, Prεεch en-
sures DP by adding a suitable amount of dummy words to S
before sending it to the CSP. This way, the CSP is allowed
only a differentially private view of the word histogram and
any subsequent statistical model built over it (by Thm. 4.1 in
Sec. 4.5).
The main challenge in this setting is that the dummy words
must be added in the speech domain, which Prεεch addresses
as follows. First, Prεεch estimates the general domain of
the text for S (specifically its vocabulary, details in Sec. 4.5)
from T OSPS . Next, it generates dummy text segments using a
state-of-the-art NLP language model. Finally, Prεεch applies
text-to-speech (TTS) transforms to these dummy segments
and adds them to S. However, leaving it just at this would be
insufficient as the CSP can potentially distinguish between
the two different sources of speech (TTS generated dummy
segments and segments in S) based on their acoustic features.
Therefore, Prεεch provides the user with multiple options to
synthesize indistinguishable dummy segments, namely (1)
voice cloning [19], and (2) voice conversion [20, 43]. These
options offer different trade-offs between utility, usability,
and privacy (Secs. 4.5.2 and 4.6). As stated in Sec. 3.2, text-
based attacks exploit individual sensitive words or the order
of the words or the word histogram. Thus, from the above
discussion,Prεεch protects privacy along all three dimensions
(evaluation results in Sec. 7).
4.2.2 Preserving Voice Privacy
Voice conversion, VC, is a standard speech processing tech-
nique that transforms the voice of a source speaker of a speech
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Figure 1: High-level overview of Prεεch, showing the knobs where a user can tune the associated trade-offs.
utterance to that of another speaker. Prεεch applies voice con-
version to fulfill a two-fold agenda. First, it obfuscates the
sensitive voice biometric features in S. Second, VC ensures
that the dummy segments (noise added to ensure differential
privacy) are acoustically indistinguishable from the original
speech file segments. There are two main categories in voice
conversion: one-to-one VC, and many-to-one VC ( Sec. 4.6).
4.2.3 End-to-End System Description
Fig. 1 depicts the workflow of Prεεch. Given a speech file S,
the first step (1) is to break S into a sequence of disjoint and
short speech segments, S. This is followed by (2) sensitive
word scrubbing where speech segments containing numbers,
proper nouns, and user-specified keywords are removed from
S. Next, (3) given the domain of S’s textual content (its vocab-
ulary), Prεεch generates a set of text segments (as is suitable
for satisfying the DP guarantee as discussed in Sec. 4.5), and
subjects it to TTS transformation (4). At this point, Prεεch
has audio segments for the input speech, S, as well as the
dummy segments, Sd . If the user also wants to hide the voice
biometric information in S, Prεεch applies (5) voice conver-
sion over all the segments in S
⋃
Sd to convert them to the
same target speaker. This process hides the acoustic features
of S and ensures that the segments in S and Sd are indistin-
guishable. This is followed by Prεεch partitioning S across
N > 0 non-colluding CSPs (Sec. 4.5). This partitioning re-
duces the number of dummy segments that are required to
achieve the DP guarantee (Sec. 4.5). Next, Prεεch adds a suit-
able amount of dummy segments from Sd to each partition
Si, i∈ [N] and shuffles them. Additionally, Prεεch keeps track
of time-stamps of the dummy segments, T Si and order of
shuffling, Orderi for each such partition (6). After obtaining
the transcript (7) for each partition from the N CSPs, Prεεch
removes Sd’s transcripts and de-shuffles the remaining por-
tion of the transcript using T Si and Orderi, and outputs the
final transcript to the user (8).
In what follows, we elaborate on the key components of
Prεεch, namely segmentation, sensitive word scrubbing, DP
word histogram release, and voice conversion.
Figure 2: An illustration of Prεεch’s segmentation algorithm.
The coarse segments in light gray. The absence of pitch infor-
mation indicate non-speech instances, which further breaks
down the coarse segments into finer segments.
4.3 Segmentation Algorithm
A key component of Prεεch is breaking the textual context
by segmenting S. We represent S as a sequence of segments
S, where each segment can contain multiple words. Prεεch
applies a hierarchical segmentation approach that starts with
a stage of silence detection based on the energy level, fol-
lowed by pitch detection to detect speech activity for finer
segmentation. The mechanism is illustrated in Fig. 2.
We define a period of silence as the time duration when
the RMS power of the speech signal drops below -35 dB
for at least 500ms. The initial segmentation stage detects
such silence periods from S resulting in coarse segments. A
human speech signal can be viewed as a modulated periodic
signal where the signal period is referred to as the glottal
cycle [26]. In the second stage, Prεεch uses the existence of
glottal cycles [6] to detect human voice, which breaks down
the coarse segments into finer ones. A time duration of at least
20 ms without the presence of glottal cycles is regarded as
non-speech.
As some segments might be abrupt or too short to allow for
correct speech recognition, Prεεch performs two additional
optimization steps. First, it merges nearby fine segments to
ensure a minimum length per segment. Second, it does not
partition segments at the boundaries of the identified human
speech and allows 40 ms of non-speech to be included at the
beginning and the end of each segment.
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Control Knob: Segmenting S presents with a trade-off –
smaller segments result in better privacy guarantee at the
expense of deteriorated transcription accuracy due to semantic
context loss. Prεεch allows the user to tune the minimum
length of the segments as a means to control this trade-off.
4.4 Sensitive Word Scrubbing
Prεεch performs sensitive word scrubbing (SWS) as follows.
First, it obtains the offline transcript of S, T OSPS . Next, it ap-
plies named entity recognition (NER) on T OSPS . NER is an
NLP technique that seeks to locate and classify named entities
in text into pre-defined categories such as the names of per-
sons, organizations, locations, expressions of times, monetary
values, etc. Prεεch also gives the option for users to specify
some keywords of their choice. This allows customization of
the sensitive keyword list as users have subjective ideas of
what they might consider sensitive.
After the list of sensitive words is finalized, Prεεch applies
keyword spotting (KWS) on the segments. KWS is needed for
the following three reasons. First,KWS is used to spot the user-
defined keywords which cannot be identified by NER. Second,
the initial TOSPS is generated on S without segmentation to
achieve the highest estimation accuracy. However, for Prεεch,
we need to identify the segments containing the keywords.
Finally, the OSP might not transcribe the named-entities cor-
rectly at all locations. For example, the name “Carpenter”
might be repeated 20 times in S, while the OSP transcribes
it accurately only five times. KWS has higher accuracy in
spotting keywords than the OSP’s transcription accuracy.
Control Knob: KWS takes the list of keywords and matches
them phonetically to a speech file based on a sensitivity score.
This sensitivity score sets a threshold for the phonetic similar-
ity required for a keyword to be spotted. A low score results in
false positives by flagging phonetically similar words as key-
words which degrades the utility by transcribing non-sensitive
segments using the OSP. Conversely, a high score could re-
sult in some keywords being missed and revealed to the CSP.
Hence, the sensitivity score is a trade-off parameter between
privacy and utility (Sec. 7.3.1).
4.5 Differentially Private Word Histogram
We define vocabulary,V , to be the domain of non-stop and
stemmed words from which T gS is constructed. Let ci denote
the frequency of the word wi ∈ V in T gS . As is typical in
the NLP literature, we model the transcription as a bag of
words: BoW = {wi : ci|wi ∈V }. Additionally, let H represent
[ci] – the count vector of BoW . In other words, the bag of
words model represents a histogram on the vocabulary, i.e., a
mapping from V to N|V |.
4.5.1 Privacy Definition
As discussed in Sec. 3.2, the aforementioned word histogram
is sensitive and can only be released to the CSP in a privacy-
preserving manner. Our privacy guarantee of choice is DP
which is the de-facto standard for achieving data privacy
[10, 12, 14]. DP provides provable privacy guarantees and
is typically achieved by adding noise to the sensitive data.
Definition 4.1 ((ε,δ)-differentially private d-distant his-
togram release). A randomized mechanism A : N|V |→ N|V |,
which maps the original histogram into a noisy one, satisfies
(ε,δ)-DP if for any pair of histograms H1 and H2 such that
||H1−H2||1 = d and any set O⊆ N|V |,
Pr[A(H1) ∈ O]≤ eε ·Pr[A(H2) ∈ O]+δ. (1)
In our context, the DP guarantee informally means that
from the CSP’s perspective, the observed noisy histogram,
H˜, could have been generated from any histogram within a
distance d from the original histogram, H. We define the set
of all such histograms to be the ε-indistinguishability neigh-
borhood for H. In other words, from H˜ the CSP will not be
able to distinguish between TCSPS and any other transcript that
differs from TCSPS in d words from V .
An important result for differential privacy is that any post-
processing computation performed on the output of a differ-
entially private algorithm does not cause any loss in privacy.
Theorem 4.1. (Post-Processing) Let A : X 7→ R be a ran-
domized algorithm that is (ε,δ)-DP. Let f : R 7→ R′ be an
arbitrary randomized mapping. Then f ◦A : X 7→ R′ is (ε,δ)-
DP.
Another result is that the privacy of DP-mechanism can be
amplified if it is preceded by a sampling step.
Theorem 4.2. Let A be an (ε,δ)-DP algorithm and D is an
input dataset. Let A ′ be another algorithm that runs A on a
random subset of D obtained by sampling it with probability
β. Algorithm A ′ will satisfy (ε′,δ′)-DP where ε′ = ln(1+
β(eε−1)) and δ′ < βδ.
Additionally, we define a DP mechanism namely the trun-
cated Laplace mechanism [5] which is used in Prεεch.
Definition 4.2 (Truncated Laplace mechanism for his-
togram). Given a histogram H, the truncated Laplace mech-
anism, Lp(ε,δ,d), adds a non-negative integer noise vector
[max(η,0)]|V | to H, where η follows a distribution, denoted
by L(ε,δ,d) with a p.d.f Pr[η = x] = p · e−(ε/d)|x−η0|, where
p = e
ε/d−1
eε/d+1
and η0 =− d·ln((e
ε/d+1)δ)
ε +d.
Theorem 4.3. The truncated Laplace mechanism satisfies
(ε,δ)-DP for d-distant histogram releases [5].
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(a) Original (b) ε=1, δ=0.05, and d=2 (c) ε=1, δ=0.05, and d=5 (d) ε=1, δ=0.05, and d=10
Figure 3: The word cloud of the Facebook dataset visualizing the histogram as it changes after adding different levels of noise.
Fig. 3 visualizes the histogram of the Facebook dataset
as a word cloud for different noise levels. As evident from
the original word cloud, the histogram emphasizes few im-
portant words such as Facebook, people, information, and
users. With increased value of d, the resulting histogram has
a roughly uniform distribution of the included words.
4.5.2 Discussion
Prεεch’s use of DP is different from the most standard use-
case of DP (like numeric datasets). It deals with concrete
units like words instead of numeric statistics – introducing
new challenges; we discuss these challenges and how Prεεch
circumvents them in this section.
Vocabulary definition: The foremost task for defining the
word histogram is defining the vocabulary, V . The most con-
servative approach to define V is to consider the total set of
all English stemmed and non-stop words. Such a vocabulary
would be prohibitively large for efficient and practical usage.
However, note that such a definition of V is an overestimate
as no real-world document would contain all possible English
words. Recall that our objective of adding noise is to obfuscate
any statistical analysis built on top of the document’s BoW
(histogram), such as a topic modeling and stylometry analy-
sis. Typically, BoW based statistical analyses are concerned
only with the set of most frequent words. For example, any
standard topic model captures only the top m percentile most
frequent words in a transcript [36, 42]. The same applies to
stylometry analysis, which is based on measures of the unique
distribution of frequently used words of different individuals.
Thus, as long as the counts of the most common words of
the transcript are protected (via DP), the subsequent statisti-
cal model (like topic model) built over the word histogram
will be privacy-preserving too (by Thm. 4.1). However, high-
frequency words might not be the only ones that contain
important information about TS. To tackle this, we also in-
clude words with large Term Frequency-Inverse Document
Frequency (TF-IDF) weight to our vocabulary. This weight is
a statistical measure used to evaluate how significant a word
is to a document relative to a baseline corpus. The weight in-
creases proportionally to the number of times a word appears
in the document but is offset by the frequency of the word in
the baseline corpus. This offset adjusts for the fact that some
words appear more frequently in general. To this end, Prεεch
makes an estimate of the vocabulary from T OSPS . Although
existing offline transcribers have high WER, we found (empir-
ically) that they can identify the set of domain words of S with
high accuracy (details in Sec. 7.3). For computing the TF-IDF
values, IDF is computed using an external NLP corpus like
Wikipedia articles. Thus formally, V = {w|w ∈ { top m per-
centile of the most frequent words in T OSPS }∪{ words with
TF-IDF value ≥ ∆ in T OSPS }}. Note that V should be devoid
of all sensitive words which are scrubbed off from S in step
2 of Fig. 1. Additionally, the vocabulary can be extended to
contain out-of-domain words, i.e., random English words that
are not necessarily part of the original document. This helps
in protecting against text classification attacks (Sec. 7.3).
Specificities of the word histogram: As discussed above,
the goal of the DP mechanism is to generate noisy counts for
each wi ∈V . An artifact of our setting is that this noise has to
be non-negative and integral. This is because dummy words
(for the noisy counts) can only be added to S; removing any
word from S is not feasible as this would entail in recogniz-
ing the word directly from S, which would require accurate
transcription. Hence,Prεεch uses the truncated Laplace mech-
anism to ensure non-negative and integral noise.
Setting privacy parameters: The parameters ε and δ quan-
tify the privacy provided by a DP-mechanism; lower the val-
ues higher is the privacy guarantee achieved. The distance
parameter d, intuitively, connects the privacy definition in the
word histogram, which is purely a formal representation, to
a semantic privacy notion. For example, it can quantify how
much the noisy topic models computed by the CSP (from
TCSPS ) should differ from that of T
g
S . Thus, the user can tune d
depending on the target statistical analysis. In the following,
we detail a mechanism, as a guide for the user, for choosing
d when the target statistical analysis is topic modeling.
Let us assume that the user has a set of speech files {S j}
to be transcribed. Let D j denote the ground truth transcript
corresponding to speech file S j. The objective is to learn t
topics from the corpus
⋃
j D j with at least k words per topic (a
topic is a distribution over a subset of words from the corpus).
Let T = {T1, · · · ,Tt} represent the original topic model built
on
⋃
j D j =
⋃
j T
g
S j and T
′ = 〈T′1, · · · ,T′t〉 represent the noisy
topic model computed by the CSP.
The following theorem (Thm. 4.4) provides a lower bound
on the pairwise `1 distance between the true and noisy top-
ics as a function of the privacy parameters of the DP word
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histogram release mechanism (specifically, the term Cmin is a
function of (d,ε,δ)).
Theorem 4.4. For any pair of topics (T,T′) ∈ T ×T ′,
||T −T ′||1 ≥ 2 1(
1−(t−1) kmax j |D j |
)(Cmin
t − 12
(
1− t kmax j |D j ||
))
,
where Cmin = min j,l
{
v·(|D j |−|wl, j |ω j)
|D j |·(|D j |+v·ω j )
}
, |D j| is the total
number of words in D j,ω j is the total number of unique words,
v is the variance of the distribution Lp(ε′,δ′,d), δ′ = βδ and
|wl, j| is the number of times the word wl ∈ V appears in D j.
The proof of this theorem and the descriptions of the pa-
rameters are presented in Appendix A.
Dummy word injection: As discussed earlier, achieving dif-
ferential privacy requires adding dummy words to S. Prεεch
generates the dummy text corpus using an NLP language
model (Sec. 6). The model takes in a short text sample from
the required topic and generates an entire document of any
required length based on that input. In some scenarios, the
user can also provide a corpus of non-publicly available doc-
uments with the same vocabulary. This scenario is valid in
many practical settings. For instance, in an educational insti-
tution, the sensitive speech files requiring transcription might
be the interviews/oral exams of the students conducted on a
specific subject, and the noise corpus can be the lecture notes
of the same subject.
Next, Prεεch generates a set of dummy segments, Sd , from
the dummy corpus above. Let us assume that each of the true
segments contains at most k non-stop words (depends on the
segment length). Prεεch ensures that each dummy segment
also contains no more than k non-stop words. Additionally,
each such segment must contain only one word from the
vocabulary V . This means that although the physical noise
addition is carried at the segment level, it is still equivalent
to adding noise at the level of words (belonging to V ) as we
only care about wi ∈V . Each dummy segment is injected only
once per CSP. Since the dummy segments have to be added
in the speech domain, Prεεch applies TTS transforms to the
segments in Sd such that they have the same acoustic features
as S. This condition ensures that Sd are indistinguishable
from S in terms of their acoustic features. Prεεch provides
the user with two broad options to satisfy this condition –
voice cloning or voice conversion.
Voice cloning is a TTS system that generates speech in a
target speaker voice. Given a speech sample from the target
speaker, the system generates an embedding of the speaker’s
voice biometric features. It uses this embedding to synthesize
new utterances of any linguistic content in the target speaker’s
voice. Prεεch utilizes such a technology to clone the original
speaker’s voice and uses it to generate acoustically similar
dummy segments Sd . Prεεch applies a state-of-the-art voice
cloning system [19], which generates a close-to-natural syn-
thetic voice using a short (∼ 5 sec.) target voice sample.
We evaluate this cloning system in Sec. 3.1, and the cloned
samples are successfully identified as the true speakers. How-
ever, voice cloning does not protect the speakers’ voice bio-
metrics, and can be potentially thwarted by a stronger ad-
versary. Hence, Prεεch provides voice conversion (VC) as
a stronger privacy-preserving option for the user. VC trans-
forms the voice of a source speaker to sound like a target
speaker. Prεεch utilizes VC to obfuscate the true speakers’
voice biometrics as well as to mitigate the DP noise indis-
tinguishability concern by converting the true and dummy
segments into a single target speaker voice (Sec. 4.6). We
discuss the utility-privacy trade-offs of both options in Sec. 7.
It is important to note that the dummy segments do not
affect the WER of TCSPS . It is so because Prεεch can exactly
identify all such dummy segments (from their timestamps)
and remove them from TCSPS . Additionally, since the transcrip-
tion is done one segment at a time, the dummy segments do
not affect the accuracy of the true segments (S) either. Seg-
mentation and voice conversion are the culprits behind the
WER degradation, as will be evident in Sec. 7. Thus in Prεεch,
the noise (in the form of dummy segments) can ensure differ-
ential privacy without affecting the utility. This is in contrast
to standard usage of differential privacy for releasing numeric
statistics where the noisy statistics result in a clear loss of
accuracy. However, the addition of the dummy segments in
Prεεch does increase the monetary cost of using the online
service that has to transcribe more speech data than needed.
We analyze this additional cost in Sec. 7.
In practice, we have multiple well-known cloud-based tran-
scription services with low WER like Google Cloud Speech-
to-Text, Amazon Transcribe, etc. Prεεch uses them to its
advantage in the following way. Prεεch splits the set of seg-
ments S into N different sets (step 3 in Sec. 4.5.3) Si, i ∈ [N]
where N is the number of CSPs with low WER. Then, Prεεch
sends each subset to a different CSP (after adding suitable
noise segments to each set and shuffling them). Since each en-
gine is owned by a different, often competing corporation, it is
reasonable to assume that the CSPs are non-colluding. Thus,
assuming that each segment contains at most one word in V ,
each subset of segments Si can be viewed as randomly sam-
pled sets from S with sampling probability β = 1/N. From
Thm. 4.2, this partitioning results in a privacy amplification.
4.5.3 Mechanism
We summarize the DP mechanism by which Prεεch generates
the dummy segments for S. The inputs for the mechanism are
(1) S – the short segments of the speech file S, (2) the privacy
parameters ε and δ and (3) N – the number of non-colluding
CSPs to use. This mechanism works as follows:
• Identify the vocabulary V = {w|w ∈ { top m percentile
of the most frequent words in T OSPS }∪{ words with TF-
IDF value ≥ ∆ in T OSPS }} through running an offline tran-
scriber over S.
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• Tune the value of d based on the lower bound from
Thm. 4.4, ε and δ.
• Generate N separate noise vectors, ηi ∼ [Lp((ln(1 +
1
β (e
ε− 1)),βδ,d)]|V |, i ∈ [N]. Thus for every partition i,
Prεεch associates each word in V with a noise value, a
non-negative integer.
• From the NLP generated text, extract all the text segments
that contain words from V . For each partition i, sample
the text segments from this corpus to match the noise
vector ηi. This is the set of noise (dummy) segments for
partition i, Sd,i. Iterate on generating text from the NLP
language model until the required noise count is satisfied.
• Randomly partition S into N sets Si, i ∈ [N] where
Pr[segment s goes to partition i] = β= 1/N,s ∈ S.
• For each partition i ∈ [N], shuffle the dummy segments in
Sd,i (after applying TTS and VC) with the segments in Si
(after applying VC), and send it to the CSPi.
The first 4 steps in the above mechanism are performed in
stage 3 in Prεεch (Fig. 1) while steps 5-6 are performed in
stage 6.
Theorem 4.5. Any topic model computed by CSPi, i ∈ [N]
from TCSPiS is (ε,δ)-DP.
Proof. From Thm. 4.2 and Thm. 4.3, we conclude that the
word histogram H˜i computed from T
CSPi
S is (ε,δ) - DP for
distance d. Thm. 4.1 proves that the topic model from H˜i is
still (ε,δ)-DP as it is a post-processing computation.
4.5.4 Novelty of Prεεch’s Use of Differential Privacy
Here, we summarize the key novelty in Prεεch’s use of DP:
(1) Typically, DP is applied to statistical analysis of numerical
data where "noise" corresponds to numeric values. In contrast,
in Prεεch, "noise" corresponds to concrete units – words. To
tackle this challenge, we applied a series of operations (seg-
mentation, shuffling, and partitioning) to transform the speech
transcription into a BoW model, where the DP guarantee can
be achieved. Moreover, the noise addition has to be done in
the speech domain. This constraint results in new challenges:
the lack of a priori access to the word histogram domain V ,
and generating indistinguishable dummy speech segments.
(2) In our setting, the use of a DP mechanism does not intro-
duce a privacy-utility trade-off from the speech transcription
standpoint. Prεεch performs transcription one segment at a
time. It keeps track of the timestamps of the dummy segments
and completely removes their corresponding text from the
final transcription (Sec. 4.2.3). This filtration step is achiev-
able in Prεεch, unlike numeric applications of DP, because of
the atomic nature of transcription. However, the dummy seg-
ments increase the monetary cost of transcription, resulting
in a privacy-monetary cost trade-off as shown in Table 3. To
tackle this issue, Prεεch takes advantage of the presence of
multiple CSPs (Sec. 4.5.2). Thus, the idea of utilizing multi-
ple CSPs for cost reduction (Thm. 4.2) is a novel contribution.
(3) We introduce an additional parameter d, the distance
between the pair of histograms, in our privacy definition
(Defn. 4.1). Intuitively, d connects the privacy definition in
the word histogram model, which is purely a formal represen-
tation, to a semantic privacy notion (e.g., `1 distance between
true and noisy topic models, Thm. 4.4) as shown in Fig. 6 and
7. This contribution builds on ideas like group privacy [12]
and generalized distance metrics [9].
4.5.5 Control Knobs
The construction of the DP word histogram provides the user
with multiple control knobs for customization:
Parameter d: According to Def. 4.1, from H˜ the CSP will not
be able to distinguish between TCSPS and any other transcript
that differs from TCSPS in d words from V . Thus, higher the
value of d, larger is the ε-indistinguishability neighborhood
for H˜ and hence, better is the privacy guarantee. But it results
in an increased amount of noise injection (hence, increased
monetary cost – details in Sec. 7.3).
Vocabulary: The size of V is a control knob, specifically, the
parameters m and ∆ and the number of out-of-domain words.
The trade-off here is: the larger the size of V , the greater is
the scope of the privacy guarantee. However, the noise size
scales with |V | and hence incurs higher cost (details in Sec.
7.3).
Voice transformation for noisy segments: Prεεch provides
two options for noise synthesis – voice cloning and voice
conversion. Voice cloning does not affect the transcription
utility, measured in WER, because it does not apply any trans-
formations on the original speaker’s voice. However, it fails
to protect the sensitive biometric information in S. Moreover,
there is no guarantee that a strong adversary cannot develop
a system that can distinguish the cloned speech segments
from the original ones. This puts Prεεch’s effectiveness at
the risk of the arms race between the voice cloning system’s
performance and the adversary’s strength. This limitation is
addressed by voice conversion at the cost of transcription
utility. We quantify these utility-privacy trade-offs in Sec. 7.
Number of CSPs used for transcription: As discussed
above, employing multiple CSPs lowers the monetary cost
incurred. However, as shown in Table 1, AWS has a higher
WER than Google. Hence, using both the CSPs results in
lower overall utility than just using Google’s cloud service.
4.6 Voice Conversion
Below, we discuss the two main categories of VC systems,
highlighting their privacy-utility trade-offs.
4.6.1 One-to-One Voice Conversion
One-to-one VC maps a predefined source speaker voice to a
target speaker voice. In Prεεch, we use sprocket [20], which
is based on spectral conversion using a Gaussian mixture
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Figure 4: An illustration of the many-to-one VC pipeline.
model (GMM). Sprocket’s training phase takes three steps: (1)
acoustic features extraction of the source and target speakers
samples, (2) time-alignment of the source and target features,
and (3) GMM model training. During conversion, sprocket
extracts the acoustic features of the new utterances, converts
them using the learned GMM model, and generates the target
waveform. Prεεch applies sprocket to convert the voice of all
source speakers, including the synthesized dummy segments,
into the same target speaker voice.
4.6.2 Many-to-One Voice Conversion
For perfect voice privacy, the VC system should (1) map any
voice (even if previously unseen) to the same target voice, (2)
not leak any distinguishing acoustic features, and (3) operate
on speech containing multiple speakers. To this end, Prεεch
deploys the two-stage many-to-one VC [43] mechanism. As
shown in Fig. 4, the first stage is a phoneme classifier that
transfers the speech utterance into phonetic posterior grams
(PPG) matrix. A PPG is a time-aligned phonetic class [43],
where a phoneme is the visual representation of a speech
sound. Thus, the phoneme classifier removes the speaker-
identifying acoustic features by mapping the spoken content
into speaker-independent labels. In the second stage, a speech
synthesizer converts the PPGs into the target voice.
The PPGs intermediate stage is irreversible and speaker-
independent. It guarantees that the converted dummy seg-
ments Sd and converted original segments S cannot be distin-
guished from each other. However, the actual implementation
of the system carries many challenges. The first stage is a per-
formance bottle-neck as it needs large phonetically aligned
training data to generalize to new unseen voices. We over-
come this challenge by generating a custom training speech
dataset with aligned phonemes as described in Sec. 6.
4.6.3 Control Knobs
The aforementioned VC techniques present an interesting
utility-usability-privacy trade-off. The one-to-one VC tech-
nique gives better accuracy than many-to-one VC since it is
trained for a specific predefined set of source speakers (de-
tails in Sec. 7.4.1). However, this utility gain comes at the
price of usability and privacy. First, unlike many-to-one VC,
sprocket needs parallel training data – a set of utterances spo-
ken by both the source and target speakers. Hence, it requires
an enrollment phase to get the source speaker’s voice sam-
ples, thereby limiting the scalability of Prεεch for previously
unseen speakers. Second, one-to-one VC does not provide per-
fect indistinguishability. These two limitations are mitigated
by applying many-to-one VC (Sec. 7.4.1).
5 End-to-End Threat Analysis
In this section, we go over the end-to-end system design of
Prεεch and identify potential privacy vulnerabilities.
Voice Privacy: Many-to-one VC removes all the iden-
tifying features from S, like the speakers’ voices, background
noise, and recording hardware, thereby protecting voice
privacy.
Textual Privacy: For sensitive word scrubbing, the
best-case scenario from a privacy point of view is to have the
user spell out the entire keyword list. However, due to its
high usability overhead, Prεεch uses NER instead to identify
named entities automatically from T OSPS . In Sec. 7.3.1, we
empirically show that Prεεch can achieve near-perfect true
positive rate in identifying the segments containing sensitive
words. However, this is only an empirical result and is dataset
dependent.
Our main defense against statistical analysis on the text
is the DP guarantee on the word histogram. This DP guar-
antee would break down if the adversary can distinguish the
dummy segments from the true segments. Many-to-one VC
technique, by design, ensures that both sets of segments have
the same acoustic features. However, the possibility of dis-
tinguishing them based on their textual features still remains.
To address this threat, we rely on state-of-the-art NLP models
with low perplexity (log-likelihood) scores to generate the
dummy text corpus. The low perplexity scores ensure that
the auto-generated text is as close as possible to the natural
language generated by humans [18, 35]. Although there is no
formal guarantee about the adversary’s ability to distinguish
dummy and true segments based on their textual features,
we have empirically analyzed this threat in Sec. 7.3.3 and
Sec. 7.3.4. We leverage state-of-the-art NLP techniques to
mount attacks on the dummy segments. Our results show that
the adversary fails to distinguish between the dummy and true
segments. However, the extent of such robustness is based on
the efficacy of state-of-the-art NLP techniques.
Word correlations can also weaken the DP guarantee (d−w,
if w is the maximum size of word groups with high correla-
tion). This can be addressed by either increasing d or consid-
ering n-gram (n = w) word histograms. However, this would
increase the requisite amount of dummy segments.
Long segments can also be a source of privacy vulnerability
as each segment contains more contextual information. Hence,
in the prototype Prεεch presented in the paper, we use short
segments that contain at most two non-stop words.
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Another weakness is related to vocabulary estimation, espe-
cially if some of the distribution-tail words are deemed to be
sensitive. Prεεch provides no formal guarantees on the words
that do not belong to V . Although our empirical evaluation
shows that the OSP has a very high accuracy for the weighted
estimation of V (Sec. 7.3.2), some sensitive distribution-tail
words might still be missed due to the OSP’s transcription
errors. Additionally, our formal DP guarantee holds only for
the word histogram (BOW ) on V . Textual analysis models
other than BOW are empirically evaluated in Sec. 7.3.3 and
Sec. 7.3.4.
Finally, if the CSP can reorder the segments (even partially
since the speech file it receives contains dummy segments
as well), it will be able to distinguish the dummy segments
from the true ones and hence, learn the textual content of the
file. For this again, we show empirically that current NLP
techniques fail to reorder the segments (Sec. 7.3.4) even in
the worst-case setting where all the segments go to one CSP.
However, as before, this is an empirical result only.
Formal Privacy Guarantee: For a speech file S, Prεεch pro-
vides perfect voice privacy (when using many-to-one VC) and
an (ε,δ)-DP guarantee on the word histogram for the vocabu-
lary considered (BOW), under the assumption that the dummy
segments are indistinguishable from the true segments.
6 Implementation
In this section, we describe the implementation details of
Prεεch’s building blocks (shown in Fig. 1).
Segmentation: We implement the two-level hierarchical seg-
mentation algorithm described in Sec. 4.3. The silence detec-
tion based segmentation is implemented using the Python py-
dub package7. We used Praat8 to extract the pitch information
required for the second level of the segmentation algorithm.
Sensitive Keyword Scrubbing: We use the NLP Python
framework spaCy 9 for named entity recognition (NER) from
the text. The keyword lists per each dataset can be found in Ap-
pendix B. We employ PocketSphinx10 for keyword spotting,
a lightweight ASR that can detect keywords from continuous
speech. It takes a list of words (in the text) and their respec-
tive sensitivity thresholds and returns segments that contain
speech matching the words. PocketSphinx is a generic sys-
tem that can detect any keyword specified in runtime; it is
not trained on a pre-defined list of keywords and requires no
per-user training or enrollment.
Generating Dummy Segments: We use the open source
implementation 11 of OpenAI’s state-of-the-art NLP language
model, GPT 2 [35], to generate the noise corpus.
7https://pypi.org/project/pydub/
8http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/praat/
9https://github.com/explosion/spaCy
10https://github.com/cmusphinx/pocketsphinx
11https://github.com/huggingface/transformers
Using this predictive model, we generate a large corpus
representing the vocabulary of the evaluation datasets. An
example of the generated text is available in Appendix B. To
generate the dummy segments, we segment each document
at the same level as the speech segmentation algorithm. We
build a hash table associating each vocabulary word with the
segments that contain it. Prεεch uses a dummy segment only
once per CSP to prevent it from identifying repetitions.
Text-to-Speech: We use the multi-speaker (voice cloning)
TTS synthesizer [19] to generate the speech files correspond-
ing to the dummy segments. We use a pre-existing system
implementation and pretrained models 12.
One-to-One Voice Conversion: We use the open-source
sprocket software 13. As described in Sec. 4.6.1, sprocket
requires a parallel training data and the target voice should
be unified for all source speakers. For the VCTK datasets, we
use speaker p306 as the target voice. Since we also evaluate
Prεεch on non-standard datasets (Facebook and Carpenter
cases), we had to construct the parallel training data for their
source speakers. For this, we use TTS to generate the required
target voice training utterances in a single synthetic voice.
Many-to-One Voice Conversion: We utilize pre-existing ar-
chitectures and hyperparameters 14 for the two-stage many-to-
one VC [43] mechanism, shown in Fig. 4. The first network,
net1, is trained on a set of {raw speech, aligned phoneme
labels} samples from a multi-speaker corpus, where the la-
bels are the set of 61 phonemes from the TIMIT dataset. The
only corpus that has a manual transcription of speech to the
phonemes’ level is the TIMIT dataset – a limited dataset. We
found that training net1 on TIMIT alone results in an infe-
rior WER performance. For better generalization, we augment
the training set by automatically generating phoneme-aligned
transcriptions of standard ASR corpora. We use the Montreal
Forced Aligner 15 to generate the aligned phonemes on Lib-
riSpeech and TED-LIUM [37] datasets. The second network,
net2, synthesizes the phonemes into the target speaker’s voice.
It is trained on a set of {PPGs, raw speech} pairs from the
target speaker’s voice. We use the trained net1 to generate the
PPGs data for training net2. As such, we only need speech
samples of the target speaker to train net2. This procedure also
allows net2 to account for net1’s errors. We use Ljspeech16
as the target voice for its relatively large size – 24 hours of
speech from a single female.
7 Evaluation
We evaluate how well Prεεch meets the design objectives of
Sec. 4. Specifically, we aim to answer the following questions:
12https://github.com/CorentinJ/Real-Time-Voice-Cloning
13https://github.com/k2kobayashi/sprocket
14https://github.com/andabi/deep-voice-conversion
15https://montreal-forced-aligner.readthedocs.io/en/latest/
16https://keithito.com/LJ-Speech-Dataset/
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Datasets Cloning One-to-One Many-to-One OSP
VCTK p266 5.15 (80.73%) 16.55 (38.06%) 21.92 (17.96%) 26.72
VCTK p262 4.53 (71.63%) 7.39 (53.73%) 10.82 (32.25%) 15.97
Facebook1 8.26 (66.59%) 14.60 (40.94%) 20.30 (17.88%) 24.72
Facebook2 9.75 (63.36%) 18.27 (31.34%) 19.44 (26.94%) 26.61
Facebook3 14.93 (51.40%) 23.25 (24.32%) 27.06 (11.91%) 30.72
Carpenter1 14.43 (44.18%) 23.88 (7.62%) 22.63 (12.46%) 25.85
Carpenter2 13.53 (65.93%) 33.71 (15.11%) 38.90 (2.04%) 39.71
Table 2: WER (%) of end-to-end Prεεch which represents the accumulative
effect of segmentation, SWS, and different settings of voice privacy and its
relative improvement in (%) over OSP (Deep Speech).
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Figure 5: ROC curve for sensitive words detec-
tion at different values of the sensitivity score.
(Q1.) Does Prεεch preserve the transcription utility?
(Q2.) Does Prεεch protect the speakers’ voice biometrics?
(Q3.) Does Prεεch protect the textual content of the speech?
(Q4.) Does the different control knobs provide substantial
flexibility in the utility-usability-privacy spectrum?
We answer the first three questions for a prototype imple-
mentation of Prεεch that provides the maximum degree of
formal privacy and hence, the least utility. For evaluating Q4,
we relax the privacy guarantee to obtain utility and usability
improvements.
Prototype Prεεch: For the prototype Prεεch presented in
the paper: (1) segmentation length is adjusted to ensure that
each segment contains at most two non-stop words (2) noisy
segments are generated via the GPT2 language model (3) a
single CSP (Google) is utilized (4) many-to-one VC is applied
to both the dummy and true segments.
7.1 Q1. Transcription Utility
We assess the transcription WER after deploying end-to-end
Prεεch on the non-standard datasets. Recall that Table 1 in
Sec. 2.2 shows the baseline WER performance of the CSP
and OSP before applying Prεεch.
WER Analysis: Column 4 in Table 2 shows the end-to-end
WER for the prototype Prεεch which represents the accu-
mulative effect of segmentation, SWS, and many-to-one VC.
Although VC is the main contributor to Prεεch’s WER, as is
evident from Sec. 7.4.1 and Sec. 7.3.1, there are two main ob-
servations. First, many-to-one VC is superior to Deep Speech.
Specifically,Prεεch’s relative improvement over Deep Speech
ranges from 11.91% to 32.25% over the evaluation datasets
(except for Carpenter2). Recall that we trained the VC system
using standard ASR corpora, while we evaluate the WER on
non-standard cases. Still, Prεεch’s WER is superior to that
of Deep Speech, which has been trained through hundreds
of hours of speech data. Second, Prεεch does not have the
same performance for all the datasets. This observation arises
again from the lack of diversity in our VC training set. For
example, the speaker in Carpenter 1 speaks loudly, allowing
VC to perform well. On the other hand, the second speaker
(Carpenter 2) is not as clear or loud, which results in an in-
ferior VC performance. This observation is consistent with
Deep Speech as well.
Our experiments show that these results can be improved by
adding samples of the source speaker voice to the training
pipeline of net1 and net2. We chose not to go with this ap-
proach as this limits the usability of the system, and in such a
case sprocket (Sec. 7.4.1) would be a better choice.
7.2 Q2. Voice Biometric Privacy
To test the voice biometric privacy, we conduct two experi-
ments using the voice analysis APIs (details in Sec. 3.1). In
the first experiment, we assess the CSP’s ability to separate
speech belonging to different speakers after Prεεch applies
the VC system. On our multi-speaker datasets, IBM diariza-
tion API concludes that there is only one speaker present.
Furthermore, we run the diarization API after adding the
dummy segments (after TTS and VC). Again, the API detects
the presence of only one speaker. Thus, not only does Prεεch
hide the speaker’s biometrics and map them to a single target
speaker but also ensures noise indistinguishability, which is
key to its privacy properties.
The second experiment tests Prεεch’s privacy properties
against a stronger adversary, who has access to samples from
the true speakers. We enroll segments from the true speakers
as well as the fake target speaker to Azure’s Speaker Identifi-
cation API. We pass the segments from Prεεch (after adding
dummy segments and applying VC) to the API. When many-
to-one VC is applied, in all evaluation cases, the API identifies
the segments as belonging to the fake target speaker. Not a
single segment was matched to the original speaker. Both ex-
periments show that prototype Prεεch is effective in sanitizing
the speaker’s voice and ensuring noise indistinguishability.
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Datasets |V | # words #Extra words due to dummy segments
in T gS d=2 d=5 d=15
VCTK p266 483 922 ($0.22) 2915 ($0.68) 7247 ($1.69) 23899 ($5.58)
VCTK p262 471 914 ($0.21) 2845 ($0.66) 7157 ($1.67) 23230 ($5.42)
Facebook 1098 5326 ($1.24) 6660 ($1.55) 16567 ($3.87) 54038 ($12.62)
Carpenter 1474 7703 ($1.80) 8915 ($2.08) 22296 ($5.20) 72907 ($17.02)
Table 3: Number of extra words due to dummy segments
and the additional monetary cost in USD with varying d,
at ε= 1 and δ= 0.05.
Figure 6: Sentiment scores heatmap of 10 doc-
uments with varying d, at ε= 1 and δ= 0.05.
7.3 Q3. Textual Privacy
We perform an extensive evaluation of the textual privacy,
including sensitive word scrubbing, analysis of the DP mech-
anism, and defense against statistical analysis.
7.3.1 Sensitive Words Scrubbing:
We run PocketSphinx keyword spotting on each dataset at dif-
ferent sensitivity scores ranging from 0.2 to 117. Fig. 5 shows
the detection true positive rate (TPR) versus the false positive
rate (FPR) at different sensitivity scores. As the figure shows,
the sensitivity score is a trade-off knob between privacy (high
TPR) and utility (low FPR). We observe that Prεεch is able
to achieve almost perfect TPR with low FPR values.
Next, we evaluate the impact of SWS on the transcription
utility. We set a sensitivity score of 0.95 for all the datasets to
have a near-perfect TPR while minimizing the FPR. Our ex-
periments show that the total duration of the segments flagged
with sensitive keywords at this score is: 0.13%, 0.06%, 0.18%,
0.20%, and 0.08% of the total duration of each dataset in
Fig. 5. Then, we transcribe the sensitive-flagged segments
using Deep Speech. The overall transcription accuracy after
SWS (i.e., equivalent to choosing voice cloning in Prεεch as
cloning results in no addition WER) is presented in the second
column of Table 2. Since the segments are short, the portion
of speech transcribed locally is limited. Hence, the impact of
the OSP transcription errors is not significant.
7.3.2 DP Mechanism Analysis:
We follow the DP mechanism described in Sec. 4.5.3.
Vocabulary Estimation: We estimate the vocabulary V us-
ing the OSP transcript. Let W represent the set of unique
words in T gS . We define the accuracy of the vocabulary es-
timation, Dacc, as the ratio between the count of the cor-
rectly identified unique words from T OSPS , |W |est , and the
count of the unique words in T gS , |W |. For our datasets,
the domain estimation accuracy is at least 75.54%. We
also calculate the weighted estimation accuracy defined as:
17The sensitive keywords list for each dataset is in Appendix B.
Dweighted =
∑P(west ).1west∈W
|W | where P(west) is the weight of
the estimated word west in T
g
S . Dweighted is more informative
since it gives higher weights to the most frequent words in T gS .
The weighted estimation accuracy is 99.989% in our datasets.
From West we select V over which we apply the DP mecha-
nism. Additionally, we extend our vocabulary to contain a set
of random words from the English dictionary.
Histogram Distance: We analyze the distance between the
original and noisy histograms (after applying Prεεch) and
its impact on the cost of online transcription. Because of the
nature of Prεεch’s DP mechanism, the noise addition depends
on four values only: |V |, ε, δ, and d.
For all our experiments, we fix the values of ε= 1 and δ=
0.05. Table 3 shows the amount of noise (dummy words) and
their transcription cost in USD 18 for each of the evaluation
datasets at different values of d. Each dataset has a different
vocabulary size |V | and word count. The increase in the
vocabulary size requires adding more dummy segments to
maintain the same privacy level. In Prεεch, adding more noise
comes at an increased monetary cost, instead of a utility loss.
The table highlights the trade-off between privacy and the
cost of adding noise.
7.3.3 Statistical Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the statistical analyses (details
in Sec. 3.2) performed by the adversary to extract textual
information on the noisy transcripts obtained from Prεεch.
Topic Model: We generate the topic models from the doc-
uments corresponding to the original and noisy word his-
tograms, and evaluate their `1 distance. The topic model oper-
ates on a corpus of documents; hence we include eight more
Supreme Court cases to our original evaluation datasets (Face-
book and Carpenter). In this evaluation, we treat all these ten
documents as one corpus; we aim to generate the topic model
before and after applying Prεεch to the whole corpus.
We use AWS Comprehend API to generate the topic model.
The API needs the number of topics as a hyperparameter that
ranges from 1 to 100. Based on our apriori knowledge of the
18The pricing model of Google Speech-to-Text is: $0.009 / 15 seconds.
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Figure 7: Topics `1 distance CDF at d = 2, 5, and 15 for t = 8, 10, 12, and 14
true number of topics, we evaluate the topic model on the
following number of topics t = 8,10,12, and 14.
We statistically evaluate the `1 distance between true and
noisy topics. The topic model T = {T1, · · · ,Tt} is a set of
t topics where each Ti, i ∈ [t] is a word distribution. We use
the Hungarian algorithm to match each noisy topic T′i ∈ T ′
to its closest match in T , the true topic model. We evaluate
the topics `1 distance for 21 runs. At each run, we generate a
random noise vector per document, select the corresponding
dummy segments, and evaluate the topic model on the set
of original and noisy documents. Fig. 7 shows the empirical
CDF of the topics `1 distance at different values of d. As the
figure shows, the higher the distance parameter d, the larger
is the `1 distance between true and noisy topics.
Stylometry: In this experiment, we assume that the CSP ap-
plies stylometry analysis on TCSPS in an attempt to attribute
it to an auxiliary document whose authors are known to the
CSP. To evaluate the worst-case scenario, we assume the ad-
versary possesses the original document T gS , and we compute
the `2 distance of the stylometric feature vectors generated
from TCSPS w.r.t T
g
S .
First, we compute the `2 distance of TCSPS before applying
Prεεch. The respective values for the Facebook and Carpenter
datasets are 28.19 and 60.45. TCSPS differs from T
g
S in lexical
features due to transcription errors and because the CSP gen-
erates the punctuation instead of the actual author.
Second, we apply Prεεch on the two datasets at different
values of the distance parameter: d = 0,2,5,15. The corre-
sponding `2 distances for the Facebook (Carpenter) dataset
equal: 73.14 (83.64), 328.80 (577.72), 947.58 (1629.79), and
2071.18 (3582.10). Note that the `2 distance at d = 0 shows
the effect of segmentation and SWS only on obfuscating
the lexical features. Clearly, adding the dummy segments
increases the `2 distance. This is expected as most of the
lexical features are obfuscated by the DP mechanism.
Category Classification: Google’s NLP API can classify a
document to a predefined list of 700+ document categories19.
First, we run the classification API on the original documents
from the topic modeling corpus. All of them classify as Law
19https://cloud.google.com/natural-language/docs/categories
& Government. Running the API on Prεεch processed docu-
ments, using an extended-vocabulary (i.e., contains random
words), dropped the classification accuracy to 0%. None of
the documents got identified as legal, law, or government even
at the smallest distance parameter value d = 2. Although a
portion of the noise words belongs to the original Law &
Government category, segmentation, shuffling, and the out-of-
domain noise words successfully confuse the classifier.
Sentiment Analysis: Sentiment analysis generates a score in
the [−1,1] range, which reflects the positive, negative, or neu-
tral attitude in the text. First, we evaluate the sentiment scores
of the original ten documents. For all of them, the score falls
between −0.2 and −0.9, which is expected as they represent
legal documents. Next, we evaluate the scores from Prεεch
processed documents considering an extended-vocabulary.
We find that all scores increase towards a more positive opin-
ion. Fig. 6 shows a heatmap of the sentiment scores as we
change the distance parameter d for the then evaluation doc-
uments. Thus, Prεεch’s two-pronged approach – 1) addition
of extended-vocabulary noise 2) removal of ordering infor-
mation via segmentation and shuffling, proves to be effective.
In a setting where the adversary has no apriori knowledge
about the general domain of the processed speech, the noise
addition mechanism gains extend from DP guarantee over the
histogram to other NLP analyses as well.
7.3.4 Indistinguishability Of Dummy Segments
The indistinguishability of the dummy segments is critical
for upholding the DP guarantee in Prεεch. We perform two
experiments to analyze whether current state-of-the-art NLP
models can distinguish the dummy segments from their tex-
tual content.
Most Probable Next Segment: In this experiment, the adver-
sary has the advantage of knowing a true segment St that is at
least a few sentences long from the Facebook dataset. We use
the state-of-the-art GPT 20 language model by OpenAI [34]
to determine the most probable next segment following St
using the model’s perplexity score. In NLP, the perplexity
score measures the likelihood that a piece of text follows the
20https://github.com/huggingface/transformers
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Figure 8: Segmentation trade-off between utility and privacy.
WER(%) is measured using Google Cloud Speech-to-Text.
language model. We get the perplexity score of stitching St to
each of the other segments at the CSP. The segment with the
lowest perplexity score is selected as the most probable next
segment. We iterate over all the true segments of the Facebook
dataset, selecting them as St . We observed that a dummy seg-
ment is selected as the most probable next segment in 53.84%
of the cases. This result shows that the language model could
not differentiate between the true and dummy segments even
when part of the true text is known to the adversary.
Segments Re-ordering: Next, we attempt to re-order the seg-
ments based on the perplexity score. We give the adversary
the advantage of knowing the first true segment S0. We get the
perplexity score of S0, followed by each of the other segments.
The segment with the lowest score is selected as the second
segment S1 and so on. We use the normalized Kendall tau
rank distance Kτ to measure the sorted-ness of the re-ordered
segments. The normalized Kτ distance measures the number
of pairwise disagreements between two ranking lists, where 0
means perfect sorting, and 1 means the lists are reversed. The
Kτ score for running this experiment on the Facebook dataset
is 0.512, which means that the re-ordered list is randomly
shuffled w.r.t the true order. Hence, our attempt to re-order
the segments has failed.
These empirical results show that it is hard to re-order the seg-
ments or distinguish the dummy segments. This is expected
due to three reasons: (1) the segments are very short; (2)
the dummy segments are generated using a state-of-the-art
language model; and (3) we observed that most of the tran-
scription errors happen in the first and last words of a segment
due to breaking the context. These errors add to the difficulty
of re-ordering. Moreover, if the user partitions S among mul-
tiple CSP’s (Sec.4.5.3), then consecutive segments would not
go to the same CSP with high probability. This setting would
increase Prεεch’s protection against re-ordering attacks.
7.4 Q4: Flexibility of the Control Knobs
7.4.1 Utility-Privacy Trade-off
In this section, we empirically evaluate the controls knobs
that provide a utility-privacy trade-off.
Minimum segment length: Fig. 8 shows the trade-off be-
tween the number of words per segment and WER as function
of the minimum segment length. As expected, increasing the
minimum duration of a segment results in an increase in the
number of words per segment. The WER in turn drops when
the number of words per segment increase as the transcrip-
tion service has more textual context. However, it can lead to
potential privacy leakage. The results in Fig. 8 indicate that
for two real-world datasets, the number of words per segment
can be kept between 2 and 3 with an acceptable degradation
of the WER.
Voice Cloning: Voice cloning does not affect the true seg-
ments (it is only applied to dummy segments), resulting in no
additional WER degradation. The WER for deploying voice
cloning is incurred only due to segmentation and SWS. Thus,
as shown in column 2 of Table 2, the relative improvement
in WER ranges from 44% to 80% over Deep Speech. This
approach, however, has two limitations. First, the speaker’s
voice biometrics from S are not protected. Second, there is no
guarantee that an adversary would not be able to distinguish
the cloned speech segments from the original ones.
Sensitivity score of KWS: As shown in Fig. 5, lower the
sensitivity score, higher is the TPR and hence greater is the
privacy (most prominent in the Carpenter2 dataset). However,
this also increases the FPR, which means a larger number of
non-sensitive segments are transcribed via the OSP resulting
in reduced accuracy.
One-To-One VC: Table 2, column 3, shows that one-to-one
VC outperforms many-to-one VC on most of the datasets. This
result is expected since sprocket is trained and tested on the
same set of source speakers while the many-to-one VC system
generalizes to previously unseen speakers.
We observe that the improvement for the VCTK dataset is
more significant than others. Recall that in our one-to-one
VC implementation in Sec. 6, the target voice for VCTK is a
natural voice – speaker p306. The target voice for the other
datasets is a synthetic one, which hinders the quality of the
converted voice and the transcription accuracy. We investigate
this observation by training sprocket for VCTK on a synthetic
target voice as well. The WER then increased to 19.33% and
9.21% for p266 and p262. Hence, we attribute the difference
in the relative improvement to the target voice naturalness. In
practice, the target voice could easily be a natural pre-recorded
voice, and the users are asked to repeat the same utterances at
the enrollment phase.
However, the one-to-one VC technique suffers from some
privacy loss. The one-to-one VC system translates the acoustic
features from a source to a target speaker’s voice. Hence, it
may leak some features from the source speaker. We observed
that one-to-one VC is vulnerable to speaker identification
analysis. Specifically, using Azure’s Speaker Identification
API, 10% of the voice-converted segments using sprocket
were identified to their true speakers.
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7.4.2 Usability-Privacy Trade-off
In our setting, usability can be measured along three dimen-
sions: latency, monetary cost, and implementation overhead.
However, we would like to stress that Prεεch is not designed
for real-time speech transcription. Hence, latency is not a pri-
mary concern for Prεεch. Nevertheless, we include it in the
following discussion for the sake of completeness.
Latency Evaluations: Note that all the operations of Prεεch
are performed on speech segments. Hence, the latency is
linear in the number of segments. We evaluate the end-to-end
system latency per segment (with length ∼ 6s) for the OSP,
the CSP, and Prεεch; the latency values are 2.17s, 1.70s,
and 14.90s, respectively. We observe that the overhead of
Prεεch is mostly attributed to the many-to-one VC (11s per
segment on average). When voice cloning (or one-to-one VC)
is applied instead, Prεεch’s end-to-end per segment latency
reduces to 3.90s (or 11.47s) at the expense of a privacy loss
as discussed in Sec.7.4.1.
Vocabulary Size: Considering a larger V (Sec. 4.5.3) in-
creases the scope of the DP guarantee. For example, adding
external words provides protection against statistical analysis
like text classification (Sec.7.3). However, larger V results in
increased amount of dummy segments and hence, increased
monetary cost (Table 3). For example, extendingV by∼ 1000
out-of-domain words for the Carpenter dataset incurred a total
cost of $25 at d = 15.
Distance Parameter d: As explained in Sec. 4.5.2, larger
the value of d, greater is the scope of privacy. However, the
amount of required noise increases by d. For example, for the
dataset VCTK p266, increasing d from 2 to 15 increases the
cost by roughly $5 (Table 3).
7.4.3 Utility-Usability Trade-off
The following control knobs provide a venue for customizing
the utility-usability trade-off.
Number of CSPs: As discussed in Sec. 4.5.2, using multiple
CSPs reduces the amount of dummy segments (and hence,
the monetary cost) in Prεεch. However, it comes at the price
of utility; the transcription accuracy of the different available
CSPs varies. For example, from Table 1, we observe that
AWS has a higher WER than Google. Thus, using multiple
CSPs may result in a lower mean utility.
One-to-One VC: As discussed above, one-to-one VC tech-
nique has lower WER than many-to-one VC technique (Table
2). However, it requires access to representative samples of
the source speaker voice for parallel training thereby limiting
scalability for previously unseen speakers (Sec. 4.6).
8 Related Work
In this section, we provide a summary of the related work.
Privacy by Design: One class of approaches redesigns the
speech recognition pipeline to be private by design. For exam-
ple, Srivastava et al. proposes an encoder-decoder architecture
for speech recognition [41]. Other approaches address the
problem in an SMC setting by representing the basic opera-
tions of a traditional ASR system using cryptographic primi-
tives [31]. VoiceGuard is a system that performs ASR in the
trusted execution environment of a processor [7]. However,
these approaches require redesigning the existing systems.
Speech Sanitization: Recent approaches have considered
the problem from a similar perspective as ours. They sanitize
the speech before sending it to the CSP. One such approach
randomly perturbs the MFCC, pitch, tempo, and timing fea-
tures of a speech before applying speech recognition [44].
Others sanitize the speaker’s voice using vocal tract length
normalization (VTLN) [32, 33]. A recent approach modifies
the features relevant to emotions from an audio signal, makes
them less sensitive through a GAN [3]. Last, adversarial at-
tacks against speaker identification systems can provide some
privacy properties. These approaches apply minimal pertur-
bations to the speech file to mislead a speaker identification
network [8, 21].
These approaches are different from ours in two ways.
First, they do not consider the textual content of the speech
signal. The only exception is the approach by Qian et al. [33],
which addresses the problem of private publication of speech
datasets. This approach requires a text transcript with the
audio file, which is not the case for the speech transcription
task. In addressing the textual privacy of a speech signal,
Prεεch adds indistinguishable noise to the speech file. The
proposed techniques fail to provide this property. Second,
the approaches above only consider voice privacy against a
limited set of features, such as speaker identification or emo-
tion recognition. Prεεch applies many-to-one VC to provide
perfect voice privacy.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed Prεεch, an end-to-end system
for speech transcription that (1) protects the users’ privacy
along the acoustic and textual dimensions at (2) an improved
performance relative to offline ASR, (3) while providing cus-
tomizable utility, usability, and privacy trade-offs.
Acknowledgment
The work reported in this paper was supported in part by the
NSF under grants 1661036, 1838733, 1942014, and 1931364.
We also acknowledge Google for providing us with Google
Cloud Platform credits and NVIDIA Corporation with the
donation of the Quadro P6000 GPU used for this research.
We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their
useful comments and Micah Sherr for shepherding this paper.
16
References
[1] An all-neural on-device speech recognizer.
https://ai.googleblog.com/2019/03/
an-all-neural-on-device-speech.html.
[2] Prεεch demo. https://bit.ly/2Vytbx7.
[3] R. Aloufi, H. Haddadi, and D. Boyle. Emotionless:
Privacy-preserving speech analysis for voice assistants.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1908.03632, 2019.
[4] D. Amodei, S. Ananthanarayanan, R. Anubhai, J. Bai,
E. Battenberg, C. Case, J. Casper, B. Catanzaro,
Q. Cheng, G. Chen, et al. Deep speech 2: End-to-end
speech recognition in english and mandarin. In Interna-
tional conference on machine learning, pages 173–182,
2016.
[5] J. Bater, X. He, W. Ehrich, A. Machanavajjhala, and
J. Rogers. Shrinkwrap: Differentially-private query
processing in private data federations. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1810.01816, 2018.
[6] P. Boersma. Accurate short-term analysis of the fun-
damental frequency and the harmonics-to-noise ratio
of a sampled sound. Institute of Phonetic Sciences -
University of Amsterdam, 17:97–110, 1993.
[7] F. Brasser, T. Frassetto, K. Riedhammer, A.-R. Sadeghi,
T. Schneider, and C. Weinert. Voiceguard: Secure and
private speech processing. In Interspeech, pages 1303–
1307, 2018.
[8] W. Cai, A. Doshi, and R. Valle. Attacking speaker recog-
nition with deep generative models. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1801.02384, 2018.
[9] K. Chatzikokolakis, M. E. Andrés, N. E. Bordenabe, and
C. Palamidessi. Broadening the scope of differential pri-
vacy using metrics. In E. De Cristofaro and M. Wright,
editors, Privacy Enhancing Technologies, pages 82–102,
Berlin, Heidelberg, 2013. Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
[10] R. Chen, N. Mohammed, B. C. Fung, B. C. Desai, and
L. Xiong. Publishing set-valued data via differential pri-
vacy. Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment, 4(11):1087–
1098, 2011.
[11] M. Davino. Assessing privacy risk in outsourcing. As-
sessing Privacy Risk in Outsourcing/AHIMA, American
Health Information Management Association, 2004.
[12] C. Dwork, A. Roth, et al. The algorithmic foundations
of differential privacy. Foundations and Trends® in
Theoretical Computer Science, 9(3–4):211–407, 2014.
[13] O. Etzioni, M. Cafarella, D. Downey, A.-M. Popescu,
T. Shaked, S. Soderland, D. S. Weld, and A. Yates. Un-
supervised named-entity extraction from the web: An
experimental study. Artificial intelligence, 165(1):91–
134, 2005.
[14] A. Friedman and A. Schuster. Data mining with differ-
ential privacy. In Proceedings of the 16th ACM SIGKDD
international conference on Knowledge discovery and
data mining, pages 493–502. ACM, 2010.
[15] J. S. Garofolo, L. F. Lamel, W. M. Fisher, J. G. Fis-
cus, and D. S. Pallett. Darpa timit acoustic-phonetic
continous speech corpus cd-rom. nist speech disc 1-1.1.
NASA STI/Recon technical report n, 93, 1993.
[16] A. Graves, A.-r. Mohamed, and G. Hinton. Speech
recognition with deep recurrent neural networks. In
2013 IEEE international conference on acoustics,
speech and signal processing, pages 6645–6649. IEEE,
2013.
[17] A. Hannun, C. Case, J. Casper, B. Catanzaro, G. Di-
amos, E. Elsen, R. Prenger, S. Satheesh, S. Sengupta,
A. Coates, et al. Deep speech: Scaling up end-to-end
speech recognition. arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.5567,
2014.
[18] T. Hofmann. Probabilistic latent semantic analysis.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1301.6705, 2013.
[19] Y. Jia, Y. Zhang, R. Weiss, Q. Wang, J. Shen, F. Ren,
z. Chen, P. Nguyen, R. Pang, I. Lopez Moreno, and
Y. Wu. Transfer learning from speaker verification to
multispeaker text-to-speech synthesis. In Advances in
Neural Information Processing Systems 31, pages 4480–
4490. Curran Associates, Inc., 2018.
[20] K. Kobayashi and T. Toda. sprocket: Open-source voice
conversion software. In Odyssey, pages 203–210, 2018.
[21] F. Kreuk, Y. Adi, M. Cisse, and J. Keshet. Fooling end-
to-end speaker verification with adversarial examples.
ICASSP 2018, Apr 2018.
[22] J. Lindberg and M. Blomberg. Vulnerability in speaker
verification-a study of technical impostor techniques. In
Sixth European Conference on Speech Communication
and Technology, 1999.
[23] J. Lorenzo-Trueba, J. Yamagishi, T. Toda, D. Saito,
F. Villavicencio, T. Kinnunen, and Z. Ling. The voice
conversion challenge 2018: Promoting development
of parallel and nonparallel methods. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1804.04262, 2018.
[24] S. E. McGregor, P. Charters, T. Holliday, and F. Roesner.
Investigating the computer security practices and needs
17
of journalists. In 24th {USENIX} Security Symposium
({USENIX} Security 15), pages 399–414, 2015.
[25] H. Muckenhirn, M. M. Doss, and S. Marcell. Towards
directly modeling raw speech signal for speaker verifica-
tion using cnns. In 2018 IEEE International Conference
on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP),
pages 4884–4888. IEEE, 2018.
[26] K. S. R. Murty, B. Yegnanarayana, and M. A. Joseph.
Characterization of glottal activity from speech signals.
IEEE signal processing letters, 16(6):469–472, 2009.
[27] G. J. Mysore. Can we automatically transform
speech recorded on common consumer devices in real-
world environments into professional production quality
speech?—a dataset, insights, and challenges. IEEE Sig-
nal Processing Letters, 22(8):1006–1010, 2014.
[28] A. Nautsch, C. Jasserand, E. Kindt, M. Todisco, I. Tran-
coso, and N. Evans. The gdpr & speech data: Re-
flections of legal and technology communities, first
steps towards a common understanding. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1907.03458, 2019.
[29] S. Nutanong, C. Yu, R. Sarwar, P. Xu, and D. Chow.
A scalable framework for stylometric analysis query
processing. In ICDM 2016, pages 1125–1130. IEEE,
2016.
[30] V. Panayotov, G. Chen, D. Povey, and S. Khudanpur.
Librispeech: an ASR corpus based on public domain
audio books. In ICASSP 2015, pages 5206–5210. IEEE,
2015.
[31] M. A. Pathak, B. Raj, S. D. Rane, and P. Smaragdis.
Privacy-preserving speech processing: cryptographic
and string-matching frameworks show promise. IEEE
signal processing magazine, 30(2):62–74, 2013.
[32] J. Qian, H. Du, J. Hou, L. Chen, T. Jung, X.-Y. Li,
Y. Wang, and Y. Deng. Voicemask: Anonymize and
sanitize voice input on mobile devices. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1711.11460, 2017.
[33] J. Qian, F. Han, J. Hou, C. Zhang, Y. Wang, and X.-Y. Li.
Towards privacy-preserving speech data publishing. In
IEEE INFOCOM 2018-IEEE Conference on Computer
Communications, pages 1079–1087. IEEE, 2018.
[34] A. Radford, K. Narasimhan, T. Salimans, and
I. Sutskever. Improving language under-
standing by generative pre-training. URL
https://s3-us-west-2. amazonaws. com/openai-
assets/researchcovers/languageunsupervised/language
understanding paper. pdf, 2018.
[35] A. Radford, J. Wu, R. Child, D. Luan, D. Amodei, and
I. Sutskever. Language models are unsupervised multi-
task learners. OpenAI Blog, 1(8):9, 2019.
[36] D. Ramage, D. Hall, R. Nallapati, and C. D. Manning.
Labeled lda: A supervised topic model for credit attribu-
tion in multi-labeled corpora. In EMNLP 2009, pages
248–256, Stroudsburg, PA, USA, 2009. Association for
Computational Linguistics.
[37] A. Rousseau, P. Deléglise, and Y. Esteve. Ted-lium:
an automatic speech recognition dedicated corpus. In
LREC, pages 125–129, 2012.
[38] S. Safavi, M. Russell, and P. Jancˇovicˇ. Automatic
speaker, age-group and gender identification from chil-
dren’s speech. Computer Speech & Language, 50:141–
156, 2018.
[39] B. Schuller and A. Batliner. Computational paralin-
guistics: emotion, affect and personality in speech and
language processing. John Wiley & Sons, 2013.
[40] B. Schuller, S. Steidl, A. Batliner, F. Burkhardt, L. Dev-
illers, C. MüLler, and S. Narayanan. Paralinguistics in
speech and language—state-of-the-art and the challenge.
Computer Speech & Language, 27(1):4–39, 2013.
[41] B. M. L. Srivastava, A. Bellet, M. Tommasi, and E. Vin-
cent. Privacy-Preserving Adversarial Representation
Learning in ASR: Reality or Illusion? In INTER-
SPEECH 2019, Graz, Austria, Sept. 2019.
[42] M. Steyvers and T. Griffiths. Probabilistic topic models.
Handbook of latent semantic analysis, 427(7):424–440,
2007.
[43] L. Sun, K. Li, H. Wang, S. Kang, and H. Meng. Pho-
netic posteriorgrams for many-to-one voice conversion
without parallel data training. In ICME 2016, pages 1–6.
IEEE, 2016.
[44] T. Vaidya and M. Sherr. You talk too much: Limit-
ing privacy exposure via voice input. In International
Workshop on Privacy Engineering (IWPE), 2019.
[45] C. Veaux, J. Yamagishi, K. MacDonald, et al. Cstr
vctk corpus: English multi-speaker corpus for cstr voice
cloning toolkit. University of Edinburgh. The Centre for
Speech Technology Research (CSTR), 2017.
[46] Z. Wu, N. Evans, T. Kinnunen, J. Yamagishi, F. Alegre,
and H. Li. Spoofing and countermeasures for speaker
verification. Speech Commun., 66(C):130–153, Feb.
2015.
18
10 Appendix A
This appendix contains the proof of Theorem 4.4 of Sec. 4.5.
Table 4: Notations
Symbol Explanations
V - the vocabulary
t - total number of topics
w - represents a word
k - minimum number of words per topic
T - represents a true topic
T′ - represents a perturbed topic
T = 〈T1, · · · ,Tt〉 - represents the true topic model
T ′ = 〈T′1, · · · ,T′t〉 - represents the perturbed topic model
d - chosen distance parameter
n - total number of documents
D - represents a document
D = ∪di=1D - the corpus of documents
ω j - total number of unique words in document D j
|wl, j| - count of word wl in document D j
|D j| - total number of words in the document D j
P - the topic distribution for D j from topic model T
P ′ - the topic distribution for D j from topic model T ′
Qi - the word distribution for topic Ti in T
Q ′i - the word distribution for topic T ′i in T ′
pi, j - probability of topic Ti occurring in document D j output
qi,l - probability of word wl occurring in topic Ti
q′i,l - probability of word wl occurring in topic T ′i
p′i, j - probability of topic T ′i occurring in document D j output
T (w) - probability of word w occurring in topic T
T ′(w) - probability of word w occurring in topic T ′
Definition 10.1. The total variation distance between two
probability distributions P and Q is defined as
δTV (P,Q) = supA∈F |P(A)−Q(A)| (2)
where F represents a sigma-algebra on the subset of the
sample space Ω.
Theorem 10.1. For a countable set, Ω
δTV (P,Q) =
1
2
||P−Q||1 = 12 ∑ω∈Ω
|P(ω)−Q(ω)| (3)
Assumption 1. If a topic p has nonzero probability of occur-
ring in a document, then the topic must contribute at least
one count for each word in it for the document.
Lemma 10.2. From assumption 1,
mini, j{pi, j} ≥ kDmax (4)
Proof. Restating assumption 1 we get,
∀i,∀ j,∀l i ∈ [t], j ∈ [n], l ∈ [|V |]
pi, j ·qi,l ≥ 1|D j|
⇒ pi, j ·qi,l ≥min
j
{ 1
|D j|
}
⇒ pi, j ·qi,l ≥ 1|Dmax|
⇒ pi, j ·minl{qi,l} ≥ 1|Dmax|
⇒ pi, j ≥ k|Dmax| [∵minl {qi,l} ≤
1
k
]
Thus mini{pi, j} ≥ k|Dmax|
Lemma 10.3. The maximum possible value of pmax is 1−
(t−1) · k|Dmax| .
Proof. According to the proof statement, the topic mixture
for a document D j is given by P j = 〈 k|Dmax| , · · · , k|Dmax| ,1−
(t−1) · k|Dmax| 〉. We will prove this by contradiction. Let there
exist some p¯ ∈ P j such that p¯ > k|Dmax| . Clearly this means
that maxi, j{pi, j}= 1−(t−2) · k|Dmax|− p¯< 1−(t−1) · k|Dmax| .
Clearly from lemma 10.2 this concludes our proof.
Theorem 10.4. For any pair of topics (T,T′) ∈ T ×T ′,
||T−T′||1 ≥ 2 1(
1−(t−1) kmax j |D j |
)(Cmin
t − 12
(
1− t kmax j |D j ||
))
,
where Cmin = min j,l
{
v·(|D j |−|wl, j |ω j)
|D j |·(|D j |+v·ω j
}
, |D j| is the total
number of words in D j, ω j is the total number of unique
words, v is the variance of the distribution Lp(ε′,δ′,d),
v = pre(ε
′·η0)/d( 1
(1−r)2 +
2r
(1−r)3
)
+ p f¯ r
(
e−(ε′·η0)/d −
e(ε
′η0)/d
)− (pe(ε′·η0)/d r
(1−r)2 + p f (e
−(ε′·η0)/d − e(ε′η0)/d))2,
f¯ = d fdr , f = r
( 1−rd−d·rd−1(1−r)
(1−r)2
)
, r = e−(ε′/d), p = e
ε/d−1
eε/d+1
,
η0 = − d·ln((e
ε′/d+1)δ′)
ε + d,ε
′ = ln(1+ 1β (e
ε − 1)), δ′ = βδ
and |wl, j| is the number of times the word wl ∈ V appears in
transcript D j.
Proof. For any word wl in a document D j, l ∈ [|V |], j ∈ [n],
t
∑
i=1
pi, jqi,l =
|wl |
|D j| (5)
t
∑
i=1
p′i, jq
′
i,l =
|wl |+ v
|D j|+ v ·ω j (6)
Now subtracting eq 5 from eq 6 we
t
∑
i=1
(p′i, j ·q′i,l− pi, j ·qi,l) =
v · (|D j|− |wl |ω j)
|D j| · (|D j|+ v ·ω j) (7)
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Let C j,l =
v·(|D j |−|wl |ω j)
|D j |·(|D j |+v·ω j) .
t
∑
i=1
|p′i, j ·q′i,l− pi, j ·qi,l | ≥
t
∑
i=1
(p′i, j ·q′i,l− pi, j ·qi,l) = C j,l
(8)
Now, observe that min{maxi{|p′i, j · q′i,l − pi, j · qi,l |}} occurs
when |p′1, j ·q′1,l− p1, j ·q1,l |= · · ·= |p′t, j ·q′t,l− pt, j ·qt,l | ≥
C j,l
t .
Let p ∈ P j, p′ ∈ P ′j,q ∈ Qi and q′ ∈ Q ′i such that P ,P ′,Q ,Q ′
corresponds to min{maxi{|p′i, j ·q′i,l− pi, j ·qi,l |}}. Now renam-
ing as follows
q1 = max{q,q′} (9)
p1 =
{
p if q1 = q;
p′ otherwise. (10)
q2 = min{q,q′} (11)
p2 =
{
p if q2 = q;
p′ otherwise. (12)
We get,
|p1 ·q1− p2 ·q2| ≥ C jt
⇒ |(q1−q2) · p1+q2 · (p1− p2)| ≥ C jt
⇒ |(q1−q2) · p1|+ |q2 · (p1− p2)| ≥ C j,lt
⇒ |(q1−q2) · p1|+q2 ·
(
1− t · k|Dmax|
)
≥ C j
t
[∵ From lemma 10.3]
⇒ |(q1−q2) · p1|+ 12 ·
(
1− t · k|Dmax|
)
≥ C j,l
t
[∵ By eq 11q2 <
1
2
]
⇒ (q1−q2) ·
(
1− (t−1) · k|Dmax|
)
≥ C j,l
t
− 1
2
·
(
1− t · k|Dmax|
)
[∵ By lemma 10.3]
⇒ q1−q2 ≥ 1(
1− (t−1) · k|Dmax|
) ·(C j,l
t
− 1
2
·
(
1− t · k|Dmax|
))
Now clearly
min j,l{C j,l}= max j{minl{
2d
ε · (|wl |ω j−|D j|)
|D j| · (|D j|+ 2d·ω jε )
}} (13)
Let Cmin = min j,l{C j,l}. Thus for any pair (T,T ′) ∈ T ×T ′
we have
δTV (T,T ′)≥ supw∈V |T (w)−T ′(w)|
≥ 1(
1− (t−1) · k|Dmax|
) ·(Cmin
t
− 1
2
·
(
1− t · k|Dmax|
))
(14)
Now from theorem 2.1, we have
||T −T ′||1 ≥ 2 · 1(
1− (t−1) · k|Dmax|
) ·(Cmin
t
− 1
2
·
(
1− t · k|Dmax|
))
(15)
11 Appendix B
11.1 Sensitive Keywords Lists
Table 5 presents the sensitive keywords list for each of the
evaluation datasets. We discuss Prεεch’s efficacy in scrubbing
them and its effect on the transcription utility in Sec. 7.3.1.
Datasets Facebook 1 Facebook 2 Facebook 3 Carpenter 1 Carpenter 2
ke
yw
or
ds
South Carolina Grassley Obama Miller Wessler
Harvey Cambridge Analytica Tillis Smith Massachusetts
Sandberg South Dakota Harris Stewart Kennedy
Palo Alto Kogan kogan Carpenter
Cheryl Alexander Greenwood Graham
Roberts Kogan
Breyer
Table 5: Sensitive keywords lists for each dataset
11.2 NLP Generated Text
In this section, we show a piece of the NLP generated text
using the GPT2 language model. The model’s input is a few
sentences from the Carpenter case.
"In determining that the information is reasonable, the
Court may find that this amount of intrusion is reasonable
and that it is a reasonable effort by the government to harass
privacy rights protections that normally apply to American
citizens. Have there been any other issues before the Court
before and after this hearing that we have not yet addressed.
We will be looking again, on appeal. Would the government
have done so differently today if they had arrested Petitioner
five years earlier? The Court agrees that Petitioner has the
right to petition the Court. I would agree with the court’s
conclusion that the government had previously attempted to
arrest Petitioner, such as by conducting warrantless searches
of his phone and computer in October 2009. There are some
questions on the record, however, that we would have looked
into in more detail in that regard.
DAVID GREENE: Well, they seem to have two thoughts
that I am not going to sit down and define as true or false; I
think – I’ve said it before. One thing we may know about this
case is that the judge, Judith Miller, is a professor in Duke
University’s criminal-justice faculty and when she refused
to reach a plea deal, the defense asked her to seek a final
decision in the case. They considered a reduced sentence
because this is his plea deal, which means he’s allowed to
serve his entire life in prison."
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11.3 Segmentation Algorithm
Here, we outline the formal segmentation algorithm discussed
in Sec. 4.3
Algorithm 1 Hierarchical Speech Segmentation
Input: Speech file S
Minimum segment duration lS
Output: Sequence of speech segments S
Stage 1: Silence Detection
1: Identify the timestamps tS = {t iS} corresponding to peri-
ods of silence in S
2: Divide S into a sequence of coarse segments S1 such that
each segment is bounded by sequential timestamps from
tS
Stage 2: Pitch Detection
3: S=∅
4: for segment Si1 ∈ S1
5: Divide each Si1 into a sequence of finer segments, Si2,
by identifying glottal cycles with buffers of non-
speech at the segment boundaries
6: do
7: merge adjacent segments in Si2 into a longer
segment Si
8: while (length(Si)< lS)
9: S= S+Si B “+” denotes that the segments
are added in a sequence ordered
by their timestamps
10: end for
11: Return S
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